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Abstract
Migration is an important and yet neglected determinant of institutions.
The paper documents the channels through which emigration a⁄ects home
country institutions and considers dynamic-panel regressions for a large sam-
ple of developing countries. We ￿nd that emigration and human capital both
increase democracy and economic freedom. This implies that unskilled (skilled)
emigration has a positive (ambiguous) impact on institutional quality. Simula-
tions show an impact of skilled emigration that is generally positive, signi￿cant
for a few countries in the short run and for many countries in the long run once
incentive e⁄ects of emigration on human capital formation are accounted for.
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11 Introduction
Recent research has emphasized the importance of institutions for economic growth
and development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005, Rodrik, 2007) and ex-
plored the determinants of institutions.1 This paper argues that migration is an
important determinant of institutions, not considered so far in the economic growth
literature.2
Migration ￿rst a⁄ects institutions by providing people with exit options, thereby
changing their incentives to voice (as well as their voicing technology); the existence
of an exit option and ￿for those who stay ￿the possibility of receiving remittance
income tend to act as a safety net that can alleviate social, political and economic
pressures to reform. For example, it is commonly argued that emigration to the U.-
S. has contributed to delay political change in countries such as Mexico or Haiti.3
On the other hand, once abroad, migrants can engage in political activities (e.g.,
lobby the host-country government to encourage or block ￿nancial aid, or impose
economic sanctions) that a⁄ect the institutional evolution of their home country,
for good or bad. A well-known illustration of this strategy is the very active anti-
Castro lobby in the United States which, under the leadership of the Cuban American
Nation Foundation, has long succeeded in maintaining a total embargo on economic
relations with Cuba. While it is unclear whether this has strengthened the radical
or the moderate factions in Cuba, it seems the recent immigrants, who left Cuba
more for economic than for political reasons, and the second generation of Cuban-
Americans, are more supportive of a dialogue with the communist regime in Cuba
and a softening of economic sanctions; and indeed, the Obama administration was
able in 2009 to relax restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba. A lesser known
but maybe more e⁄ective illustration (in terms of in￿ uence on home country politics)
is the Croatian diaspora in the United States and Western Europe, which strongly
supported secession from the former Yugoslavia and the transition to a market-led
economy, provided huge ￿nancial support to Tudjman￿ s Croatian Democratic Union
(CDU) party and, following the latter￿ s victory in the ￿rst post-communist elections
1For example, Rodrik et al. (2004) show that once institutions are controlled for, geography
measures have a weak direct e⁄ect on income though they have a strong indirect e⁄ect through their
impact on the quality of institutions.
2We use the terms "democracy" and "institutions" indi⁄erently as three out of four of our insti-
tutional quality indicators are standard democracy indices.
3See for example Hansen (1988) on Mexico and Fergusson (2003) on Haiti.
2in 1990, saw its e⁄orts rewarded by the allocation of 12 out of 120 seats at the
national assembly to diaspora Croats. Since then, the Croatian diaspora has remained
very active, raising funds, organizing demonstrations, petitions, media campaigns
and other lobbying activities that proved e⁄ective in obtaining o¢ cial recognition of
independence or in shaping European and American attitudes during the Yugoslavia
war.4 Diasporas may also at times side with a speci￿c group in a con￿ ict that opposes
various groups in their country of origin. For instance, Irish Catholics in the US have
historically provided ￿nancial and other forms of support to the Catholic community
in Northern Ireland. However, the continued support provided during the con￿ ict
opposing Protestants and Catholics in that country made it more di¢ cult for these
communities to reach a peace agreement.5
A second channel through which migration a⁄ects institutions has to do with the
fact that migration is a selective process. Migrants are not randomly selected out of
the country￿ s population but tend to self-select along a variety of dimension. First
and foremost, migrants are typically positively self-selected on education (migrants￿
positive self-selection on education is a rule that admits very few exceptions). Given
that more educated individuals ￿and the middle class in general (Easterly, 2001)
￿tend to have a higher degree of political participation and generally contribute a
greater deal to public policy debates, emigration is likely to hurt the quality of do-
mestic institutions as well as the process through which sound policies are formulated
and implemented. On the other hand, migration raises the expected return to human
capital, thus inducing people to invest more (or more people to invest) in education
(Mountford, 1997, Beine et al., 2001, Katz and Rapoport, 2005) and to reallocate tal-
ent toward productive and internationally transferable skills (Mariani, 2007);6 such
e⁄ects on the skill distribution can mitigate or even reverse any adverse brain drain
impact on political institutions. Another characteristic on which migrants are not
randomly self-selected is ethnicity, with an over-representation of ethnic minorities
among emigrants. This tends to recompose the home-country population towards
4See Eckstein (2009), Haney and Vanderbush (1999, 2005), and Vanderbush (2009) on Cuba, and
Djuric (2003) or Ragazzi (2009) on Croatia.
5Similar analyses have been proposed notably in the cases of Lebanon and Sri Lanka. Studies
providing detailed accounts and analysis of the role of the Irish diaspora include Holland (1999) and
Wilson (1995).
6Other political economy analyses of the interaction between emigration and institutions in de-
veloping countries include Esptein et al. (1999), Docquier and Rapoport (2003) and Wilson (2011).
3more homogeneity, again, for good or bad.7
Finally, emigration increases the home country population￿ s exposure to demo-
cratic values and norms, be it directly, through contacts with return migrants and
relatives abroad, or indirectly, through the broader scope of migration and diaspora
networks. Such networks have been shown to foster trade (Gould, 1994, Rauch and
Trindade, 2002, Rauch and Casella, 2003, Iranzo and Peri, 2009) and FDI in￿ ows
(Kugler and Rapoport, 2007, Javorcik et al., 2011) and to contribute to the di⁄usion
of technology (Kerr, 2008, Agrawal et al., 2011) as well as to the transfer of norms
of low fertility (Fargues, 2007, Beine, Docquier and Schi⁄, 2008) and, in the case
of foreign students, to the di⁄usion of democracy (Spilimbergo, 2009). In particu-
lar, Spilimbergo (2009) shows that foreign-trained individuals promote democracy at
home, but only if foreign education is acquired in democratic countries. While he
does not identify the exact mechanisms through which such an in￿ uence may materi-
alize, he suggests a number of possibilities (e.g., access to foreign media, acquisition
of norms and values while abroad that di⁄use at home upon return, etc.) that can
be generalized to other migration experiences.
Two recent micro studies come in support of this claim. The ￿rst context we
report on is Cape Verde, a nine-island tropical country o⁄ the coast of West Africa
with a population of half a million, good institutional scores by African standards, and
a long tradition of migration (current migrants represent one-￿fth of the population,
and skilled emigration rates are extremely high).8 In this context, Batista and Vicente
(2011) set up a "voting experiment" along the following lines: following a survey on
perceived corruption in public services, respondents were asked to mail a pre-stamped
postcard if they wanted the results of the survey to be made publicly available in the
national media. Controlling for individual, household and locality characteristics, they
regressed participation in the voting experiment, which they interpret as demand for
accountability, on migration prevalence at the locality level. They show that current
7In the penultimate paragraph of their article on "arti￿cial states", Alesina, Easterly and Ma-
tuszeski (2008) write: "probably the single most important issue that we have not addressed is that
of migrations. One consequence of arti￿cial borders is that people may want to move, if they can. ...
In some cases, migrations that respond to arti￿cial borders may be partly responsible for economic
costs, wars, dislocation of people, refugee crises and a host of undesirable circumstances. ... But
sometimes the movement of people may correct for the arti￿cial nature of borders."
8Brain drain ￿gures for Cape Verde are 67 percent in Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and remain
very high (60 percent) even after excluding people who emigrated before age 18 and acquired their
tertiary education abroad (Beine et al., 2007).
4Figure 1:
EMIGRATION TO THE EAST AND WEST AND CHANGE IN COMMUNIST PARTY
VOTE SHARES BETWEEN 2005 AND 2009, BY DISTRICT
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as well as return migrants signi￿cantly increase participation rates, and more so
for the latter. Interestingly, in the spirit of Spilimbergo￿ s ￿ndings, they ￿nd that
only migrants to the US seem to make an impact, while migrants to Portugal, the
other main destination, do not. In contrast, they do not ￿nd evidence of additional
e⁄ects for skilled migrants. The other context is that of Moldova, a former Soviet
Republic with virtually no emigration before 1990 and which has seen a recent surge
in migration out￿ ows, estimated at half-a-million for a population of 3.6 million in
2008. The evidence we present for Moldova, which is purely descriptive, comes from
the analysis of election outcomes in 2005 and 2009 (Omar Mahmoud et al., 2010). It
shows that higher votes for the communist party are associated at the district level
with migration to Russia while a negative correlation obtains for migration to the
EU. Moreover, changes in the share of votes gained by the communist party between
2005 and 2009 follow the same pattern (see Figure 1) and there is evidence of spillover
e⁄ects to non-migrant households as the same voting patterns are observed even after
excluding households with a (current or past) migrant member.
At a macro level, the only paper attempting to assess the overall e⁄ect of emigra-
tion on institutions we are aware of is Li and McHale (2009), who use the World Bank
5governance indicators (Kau⁄man, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005) (henceforth KKM) and
the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) migration data set in their cross-sectional analy-
sis. Focusing on skilled migration, they examine the impact of the brain drain on
sending country￿ s institutional development and ￿nd a positive e⁄ect on ￿political￿
institutions (i.e., on ￿political stability￿and ￿voice and accountability￿ ) but a neg-
ative e⁄ect on ￿economic￿institutions at home (i.e., on ￿government e⁄ectiveness￿ ,
￿regulatory quality￿ , ￿rule of law￿ , and ￿control of corruption￿ ). However, their
results su⁄er from the limits of a cross-sectional analysis9 and, as they themselves
acknowledge, from the weakness of their instrumentation strategy (they instrument
skilled emigration rates using countries￿geographical characteristics). In this pa-
per we look instead at migration in general, focus on democratic institutions, and
consider dynamic-panel regressions. We ￿nd that the emigration rate and the level
of human capital both positively a⁄ect democracy and economic freedom at home.
This implies that unskilled migration has a positive impact while skilled migration
has an ambiguous impact on institutional quality. Using the point estimates from
our regressions, we simulate the marginal e⁄ect of skilled emigration on institutional
quality. In general the simulations con￿rm the ambiguous e⁄ect of high-skill emigra-
tion. It is only when the incentive e⁄ects of emigration on human capital formation
are taken into account that a signi￿cant institutional gain obtains for some countries
in the short run, and for many countries in the long-run.
2 Empirical analysis
2.1 General Considerations
Empirical investigation of the e⁄ect of emigration on institutions in a cross-section or
a panel setting raises a di¢ cult trade-o⁄. In a cross-sectional dimension, it is possible
to use better data both for migration and institutional quality. In particular, for
migration, it is possible to use the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set, which con-
siders international migration by educational attainment. This data set describes the
emigration of skilled workers to the OECD for 195 source countries in 1990 and 2000.
For institutional quality, the World Bank Governance data by Kaufmann, Kray and
9The KKM (2005) data set starts in the late 1990s and is therefore not long enough to allow
for panel data analysis. Similarly, the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) dataset o⁄ers estimates of
emigration rates by skill levels for 1990 and 2000 only.
6Mastruzzi (2005) measures six dimensions of governance from 1996 to 2005: voice and
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government e⁄ectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. It covers 213 countries and
territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-2005.
In unreported regressions, we consider OLS regressions using these data sets. We
￿nd a signi￿cant and positive correlation between the emigration rate and institu-
tional quality indexes, but these regressions su⁄er from a lot of shortcomings. First,
it is di¢ cult to ￿nd an appropriate baseline speci￿cation, because di⁄erent economic,
political and cultural factors can be important in explaining the quality of institu-
tions. As Alesina et al. (2003) noted, various explanatory variables have been used in
the literature on the determinants of institutions, such as log of gdp per capita, legal
origin dummies, religious variables, latitude, fractionalisation indices, etc. The main
problem with these variables relates to the fact that the pattern of cross-correlations
between explanatory variables cannot be ignored and that in many cases the results
of cross-country regressions are sensitive to the econometric speci￿cation. For exam-
ple, they point out that their index of ethnic fractionalization is highly correlated
with latitude and with the log of gdp per capita (which, in addition, is very likely
endogenous). Moreover, legal origin dummies are highly correlated with religious
variables etc. In a panel dimension instead, it is possible to control for unobservable
heterogeneity and for all time-invariant variables a⁄ecting institutional quality.
Another problem of cross-sectional analysis refers to endogeneity and reverse
causality problems (i.e., bad institutions can cause migration). Attempting to con-
front the endogeneity issue directly requires ￿nding a suitable instrument. This is not
easy in our context. To properly instrument for migration we need a variable that is
correlated with the emigration rate but not directly correlated with our endogenous
variable, institutional quality. In the migration literature, country￿ s geographical fea-
tures are often used to instrument for emigration. However, in the institutions and
growth literature, the very same geographical characteristics, such as latitude or coun-
try size, are also used as determinants of institutions, which would seem to question
their theoretical validity as candidate instruments. Finally, an additional problem
in cross-section analyses has to do with the fact that institutional quality is a quite
persistent variable, therefore a dynamic model would seem to be more suited to study
the relationship between emigration and institutions. Moreover, several papers dis-
cuss the in￿ uence of education on institutional quality, therefore it is worth to include
7in our speci￿cations a variable related to education or to human capital (of course,
this would su⁄er from endogeneity). In the next section, therefore, we will study the
impact of emigration on home-country institutions using dynamic-panel regressions.
In particular, we will use the system-GMM estimator, and we will be able to control
for unobservable heterogeneity and account for endogeneity and persistency of some
of the variables, using internal instruments. As far as we know, this is the best suited
technique available when it is di¢ cult to ￿nd good external instruments, as in our
case.
2.2 Panel analysis
We follow the literature on democracy and education (Acemoglu et al., 2005, Bobba
and Coviello, 2007, Castello-Climent, 2008) and Spilimbergo￿ s (2009) study on democ-
racy and foreign education and consider the impact of emigration on institutional
quality using dynamic-panel regressions.
2.2.1 The econometric model
As in previous studies on democracy and education, we consider the level of democ-
racy as our dependent variable and we estimate the following dynamic model:
Democracyi;t = ￿0Democracyi;t￿5 + ￿1hi;t￿5 + ￿2emratei;t￿5 +
+￿3Xi;t￿5 + ￿i + ￿t + "i;t (1)
where i is the country, t is the period. All explanatory variables are lagged ￿ve
years. The lagged dependent enters the set of explanatory variables to account for per-
sistence in democracy scores. Our coe¢ cient of interest is ￿2; which re￿ ects whether
emigration (measured by the total emigration) a⁄ects democracy at home. The coef-
￿cient ￿1 captures the e⁄ect of human capital on democracy. ￿3 is a vector of coe¢ -
cients re￿ ecting the importance of other control variables such as population size and
gdp per capita (both in logs), as in Acemoglu et al. (2005). We also control for time
￿xed e⁄ects, ￿t, and country ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿i. The advantage of a panel estimation
is that it is possible to control for unobservable variables that are country-speci￿c
and whose omission in cross-sectional analyses can bias the estimated coe¢ cients.
Therefore, the results are robust to all country-speci￿c time invariant explanatory
8variables used in the cross-section literature on institutional quality, including ethnic
fractionalisation, religions, legal origins, colonial ties, geographical variables etc.
A general approach to estimate such an equation is to use a transformation that re-
moves unobserved e⁄ects and uses instrumental variables. The well-known Arellano-
Bond (1991) method considers the ￿rst-di⁄erence of the explanatory variables which
are instrumented by their lagged values in levels.10 Acemoglu et al. (2005) used this
method to study the e⁄ect of education on democracy without ￿nding any signi￿cant
e⁄ect. One of the shortcomings of this method is that, as Bond, Hoe› er and Temple
(2001) point out, the ￿rst-di⁄erence GMM estimator can behave poorly when time
series are persistent and the lagged levels of the explanatory variables turn out to
be weak instruments of the explanatory variables in ￿rst-di⁄erence. In small sam-
ples, this can cause serious estimation bias.11 To overcome these problems, Bond et
al. (2001) suggest to use a more informative set of instruments within the frame-
work developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). From
our perspective, and given that democracy varies signi￿cantly across countries but
is quite persistent over time, it is clear that the Blundell and Bond system GMM
is most appropriate. New results on the relationship between democracy and edu-
cation were found using the system GMM estimator.12 Following this literature, we
use the Blundell and Bond system GMM estimator that combines the regression in
di⁄erences with the regression in levels in a single system. The instruments used in
the ￿rst di⁄erentiated equation are the same as in Arellano-Bond (1991), but the
instruments for the equation in level are the lagged di⁄erences of the correspond-
ing variables. In order to use these additional instruments, a moment condition for
the level equation, which implies that ￿rst di⁄erences of pre-determined explanatory
10Under the assumptions that the error term is not serially correlated and that the explanatory
variables are weakly exogenous or predetermined (i.e. the explanatory variables are not correlated
with future realizations of the error term), the following moment conditions are applied for the ￿rst
di⁄erence equations:
E[Wit￿s:(￿"it)] = 0 for s ￿ 2; t = 3;::::;T
where Wit￿s are the lagged dependent and all the pre-determined variables in the model.
11Simulation results show that the Di⁄erence GMM may be subject to a large downward ￿nite-
sample bias when time series are persistent, particularly when T is small. The higher the persistence
of the series used as instruments, the weaker the correlation between levels and di⁄erences (see
Blundell and Bond (1998) for the weak instrumentation problem).
12Bobba and Coviello (2007), and Castello-Climent (2008). Splimbergo (2009) also uses system
GMM.
9variables are orthogonal to the country ￿xed e⁄ects, must be satis￿ed.13
We test the validity of moments conditions by using the test of overidentifying
restrictions proposed by Hansen and by testing the null hypothesis that the error
term is not second order serially correlated. Furthermore, we test the validity of the
additional moment conditions associated with the level equation using the Hansen
di⁄erence test for all GMM instruments.14
A particular concern related to this method is the risk of instrument prolifera-
tion. In fact, if the use of the entire set of instruments in a GMM context gives
signi￿cant e¢ ciency gains, on the other hand, a large collection of instruments could
over￿t endogenous variables as well as weaken the Hansen test of the instruments￿
joint validity.15 The instrument proliferation problem is particular important in small
samples, but unfortunately there is no formal test to detect it, even if a possible rule
of thumb is to keep the number of instruments lower than or equal to the number of
groups.16 In our analysis, we consider the lagged dependent and all the control vari-
ables of interest as predetermined, instrumented with "internal instruments", using
their own one-period and further lags, according to the speci￿cation.
2.2.2 Data
Our data set is a ￿ve-year unbalanced panel spanning the period between 1980 and
2005, where the start of the date refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t = 1980,
t ￿ 1 = 1975). In our sample, we are considering only developing countries, and
they enter the panel if they are independent at time t ￿ 1. The data set employed
in our analysis is an updated version of that used by Acemoglu et al. (2005) for
the democracy indicators (except for economic freedom) and all the control variables.
The migration data come from Defoort (2008).
Democracy
Data on democracy are taken from the Freedom House data set, from the POLITY
IV data set, and from the Economic Freedom of the World project (Simon Fraser
13For the level equation the following moment conditions are to be satis￿ed:
E [(￿Wi;t￿1)(￿i + "i;t)] = 0 for t = 4;::::T:
14This test is not reported in the tables, but it is available upon request.
15See Roodman (2009)
16The xtabond2 command, implemented in Stata, gives a warning when instruments exceed the
number of groups.
10Institute).
The Freedom House measures political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) using,
respectively, an index which ranges from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating more
freedom. The ratings are determined by a list of questions. For the political rights
index, for example, the questions are grouped into three sub-categories: electoral
processes; political pluralism and participation; and functioning of the government.
The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: freedom of expression
and belief; association and organization rights; rule of law and personal autonomy;
and individual rights. The sum of each country￿ s sub-category scores translates to a
rating from 1 to 7. Following Acemoglu et al. (2005) we transform the indexes so
that they lie between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to the most-democratic set of
institutions.
Another measure of democracy from the POLITY IV data set is considered. Indi-
cators of democracy measure the general openness of political institutions and com-
bines several aspects such as: the presence of institutions and procedures through
which citizens can express e⁄ective preferences about alternative policies and leaders;
the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive
power; and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts
of political participation. In our data set we consider a composite index (Polity2),
that ranges from -10 to + 10. This index is also normalized from 0 to 1, with 1
corresponding to the most democratic set of institutions.
Finally, we also consider Economic Freedom of the World (EFW), an index which
measures the degree to which countries￿policies and institutions support economic
freedom. Five broad areas are distinguished: (1) size of government; (2) legal structure
and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade
internationally; and (5) regulation of credit, labor and business. This index is also
normalized between 0-1.
Migration
For emigration data, we use the estimates provided in Defoort (2008). Focusing
on the six major destination countries (USA, Canada, Australia, Germany, UK and
France), she computed skilled emigration stocks and rates by educational attainment
from 1975 to 2000 (one observation every 5 years). On the whole, the six destination
countries represent about 75 percent of the OECD total immigration stock.17
17However, for some sending countries, the coverage by the Defoort dataset may be quite low. For
11Other data
Data on human capital are based on Barro and Lee (2001). Data on GDP per
capita and population data are taken from the PWT and from the World Development
Indicators. Data on legal origins are taken from La Porta et al. (1999).
2.2.3 Regression results
Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 present our main general results from estimating equation 1 and
using the Freedom House PR and CL indicators, the Polity2 measure from the Polity
IV data set, and the Economic Freedom Indicator (EFW). We start by considering
as variables of interest the lagged dependent, the total emigration rate, the share of
tertiary educated workers over the total resident labor force, and the log of population
size.
Column 1 of each table shows the pooled OLS relationship between the total
emigration rate and democracy by estimating equation 1. The results show a positive
correlation between openness to migration and democracy, statistically signi￿cant,
however, only when considering the Polity2 and EFW indexes (all standard errors
are robust and clustered by country group). In column 2, when we control for ￿xed
e⁄ect, the coe¢ cient related to the total emigration rate becomes negative (except
for EFW), and statistically not signi￿cant. We know that in a dynamic panel data
model, the standard ￿xed e⁄ect estimator is biased and inconsistent in panels with
a short time dimension (the so called Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981)). Moreover, both
in our ￿xed e⁄ect and pooled OLS estimations, explanatory variables are considered
as exogenous. To deal with these problems we use the system GMM estimator that
is consistent in dynamic panel estimations and rely on "internal instruments" to
control for a weak form of exogeneity of all explanatory variables. We consider the
explanatory variables of interest as predetermined, i.e. instrumented using their own
one-period and further lags, in order to use a relevant number of instruments for
e¢ ciency reasons and at the same time keeping the number of instruments lower
than or equal to the number of country groups in all speci￿cations.18 In column (3)
example, Surinamese emigrants mainly live in the Netherlands, with just 3 percent of Surinamese
emigrants living in the six receiving countries in Defoort￿ s sample. We will therefore conduct a
sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the results to the exclusion of low-coverage countries
in the Defoort dataset.
18A problem of the GMM estimator is that too many instruments can over ￿t the endogenous
variable. As rule of thumb, the number of instruments should be less or at least equal to the number
12of tables 1, 2, 3, 4 the estimates for the total emigration rate are now positive and
highly signi￿cant at the one percent level for all four indicators. Column (4) shows
the same speci￿cation, but now reducing the number of instruments for robustness
check. Our previous results are con￿rmed.19
The share of tertiary educated workers over the total resident labor force, as a
proxy for resident human capital, is another variable of interest in our model. As
for the total emigration rate, the results show a statistically signi￿cant and positive
correlation between the share of total educated workers and democracy in pooled
OLS regressions. The coe¢ cients turn out to be negative (except for EFW) and not
statistically signi￿cant in ￿xed e⁄ect regressions. Column (3) of tables 1, 2, 3, 4
shows the SYS GMM estimates. The estimated coe¢ cients of the share of tertiary
educated workers are now positive and statistically signi￿cant at usual signi￿cance
levels, except for the Polity2 indicators. The results are con￿rmed when reducing the
number of instruments in column (4).
In our basic speci￿cation, we add also as a regressor the logarithm of population
size (lagged), which is positive and statistically signi￿cant for two indicators out of
four when using the SYS GMM estimator. Including population size in our model
is important to avoid omitted variable bias. Indeed, population size can a⁄ect in-
stitutional quality and is often considered as an explanatory variable in the relevant
literature (see for example Acemoglu et al., 2005, and Bobba and Coviello, 2007).
At the same time, population size is negatively correlated with the emigration rate
(big countries have small emigration rates); therefore, including population size is
important to make sure the emigration rate is not simply capturing a country-size
e⁄ect.
Column (5) controls for GDP per capita (in logs). The estimated coe¢ cient of the
emigration rate is again positive and statistically signi￿cant at 10 and 1 percent when
considering the Civil Liberties and Polity2 indicators, but loses its signi￿cance when
of groups. We follow this rule even if sometimes, given few data observations and speci￿cations with
additional controls, in the reported regressions the number of instruments is slightly higher than the
number of groups. For comparative reasons, we show regressions where explanatory variables are
instrumented using their one-period to their second or third lags. In unreported regressions, when
instruments outnumber the number of groups, for robustness check, we further reduce the number
of instruments using only their one period lag. We ￿nd that results do not substantially change.
19In column 3, all the explanatory variables are considered as predetermined and instrumented
using their own ￿rst to third lags. In column 4, all the variables are instrumented using their own
￿rst to second lags.
13using the Political Rights indicator and Economic Freedom. The share of tertiary edu-
cated workers over the total residence labor force is not signi￿cant anymore, probably
due to the two variables being highly correlated (0.7145). Finally, the coe¢ cient on
the GDP per capita is in general positive but not always signi￿cant.20
The estimations con￿rm that democracy is very persistent. Moreover, considering
the ￿rst 3 columns in each table, the coe¢ cient on past democracy ranges between
the estimated coe¢ cient in pooled OLS, which is usually biased upwards, and the
estimated coe¢ cient for the ￿xed e⁄ect, which usually displays a downward bias.
The AR(2) test which tests the null hypothesis that the error term is not sec-
ond order serially correlated, and the Hansen J test of overindentifying restrictions,
indicate that the moment conditions are satis￿ed and the instruments are valid.
In general, the results appear quite robust across speci￿cations and indices.21
To evaluate whether the skill composition of migration, and not just its size, a⁄ects
institutional quality at home, we introduce in column 6 the share of tertiary educated
amongs migrants. The coe¢ cient of the share of tertiary educated migrants is negative
but not statistically signi￿cant for 3 indicators out of 4 and is only positive and
signi￿cant at the 10 percent when considering the EFW indicator. In spite or, rather,
because of this inconclusive result, we will further investigate this issue in the next
section using numerical simulations.
Finally, one may be concerned, as Acemoglu et al. (2005) were about their own
study, that the presence of socialist countries in our sample may largely a⁄ect the
estimation results. Indeed, most socialist countries had high levels of education in
the 1980s and did not experience any particularly increase in educational attainments
during or immediately after the transition. In addition, prior to the transition, legal
emigration was strongly restricted, while after the transition most socialist countries
20In unreported regressions, we also introduce as control variables, the mediam age of the pop-
ulation, and urbanization rate. While human capital loses its signi￿cance, probably because of
multicollinearity, the total emigration rate remains signi￿cant when considering these additional
control variables as exogenous. If they are considered as pre-determined, then the emigration rate
also loses its signi￿cance too, which may be due either to collinearity or instruments proliferation.
21To further assess the robustness of our results, in unreported regressions we considered the total
emigration rate divided by a coverage measure in the Defoort (2008) dataset. Recall that the Defoort
￿gures are based on the six major destination countries (USA, Canada, Australia, Germany, UK
and France). Comparing the emigration stocks in 2000 in the Defoort data set with those in the
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set (which is based to 30 OECD destination countries) yields a
variable indicating the percentage of coverage of the Defoort data set. Dividing the total emigration
rate by this coverage measure does not a⁄ect the quality of the results.
14experienced a strong increase in emigration. To control for the speci￿c characteris-
tics of these economies, in column (7) of each tables we interact human capital and
emigration with legal origin socialist dummies, ￿nding in general a statistically sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ect for the interacted terms, in particular for emigration.22 The interaction
term on emigration is negative and signi￿cant for all three "political" indicators of
democracy, and positive for the "economic" indicator. This suggests that emigra-
tion caused socialist regimes to become politically more repressive, an interpretation
which ￿ts well with the popular historical accounts of the former Communist bloc.
If it is correct, however, it should be relevant only prior to the transition. In column
(8) of each tables, we therefore consider the same interaction, but now introduce a
dummy variable which takes a value equal to 1 in years before (or equal to) 1990.
The magnitude and signi￿cance levels of the coe¢ cient are thereby increased, which
supports our interpretation of these results.
2.2.4 Robustness
The evidence found in the previous section reveals that human capital and emigra-
tion may improve institutional quality. To control for the robustness of these results,
for each indicator we consider in table 5 our benchmark speci￿cation in a balanced
sample. This allows for checking whether the entry and exit of countries from the un-
balanced sample may a⁄ect our estimates. The results for PR, CL, Polity2 indicators
are very similar to those in previous tables. Moreover, now the estimated coe¢ cient
for human capital is also statistically signi￿cant at 10 percent for the Polity2 indica-
tor. In the case of the Economic Freedom Indicator, the estimates are not reliable
due to the fact that too many observations are lost.
Table 6 provides additional robustness checks in a balanced sample when consid-
ering non-linear e⁄ects for socialist countries as in columns (7) and (8) of tables 1,
2, 3, 4. Again, the estimates are very similar to the previous ones in an unbalanced
sample, with more signi￿cant results for interacted terms with human capital. As
before, in the case of the Economic Freedom Indicator estimates are not reliable,
because too many observations are lost.
Finally, in tables 7, 8, 9, 10, socialist countries are excluded from the sample. The
results show that our ￿ndings are not driven by socialist countries.
22In the regressions, the legal origin dummy is not introduced by itself, because in SYS-GMM
￿xed e⁄ects are already taken into accounts.
15Another concern refers to the presence of oil-exporting countries. Several studies
have pointed out a negative correlation between oil export dependence and democ-
racy, with oil endowment appearing as a cause for lower democracy (e.g., Ross, 2001,
Tsui, 2010). To control for the speci￿c characteristics of these economies, in table
11 we consider interaction terms with human capital, total emigration rate and a
dummy for oil-exporting countries, both in an unbalaced and balanced sample. The
estimated coe¢ cients of human capital and the total emigration rate are in general
positive and statistically signi￿cant across indicators, as in the baseline regressions.
Interaction terms with human capital and a dummy for oil-exporting countries are
generally negative and statistically signi￿cant (with higher coe¢ cients that the es-
timated coe¢ cient of human capital). This means that, in the case of oil-exporting
countries, human capital has a negative impact on institutional quality. Interaction
terms with total emigration rate, instead, are positive, but in general not statistically
signi￿cant (except for the CL indicator).
Finally, another concern is whether Sub-Saharan African countries, which have
sometimes unstable political dynamics, may a⁄ect our results. Table 12 shows the
estimated results when we include interaction terms with a dummy for Sub-Saharan
African countries. Again, the estimated coe¢ cients of human capital and total emi-
gration rate are positive and statistically signi￿cant across the various speci￿cations
and di⁄erent institutional quality indicators, con￿rming our results. The interac-
tion terms with human capital are in general not statistically signi￿cant while those
with emigration are generally positive and statistically signi￿cant. This would seem
to suggest that African countries tend to bene￿t more from the institutional gains
emigration brings about.23



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 5: Balanced sample
PR CL POL2 EFW









Human capitalt￿5 0.708** 0.870** 0.631*** 0.737*** 0.542* 0.557* 0.0342
(0.317) (0.348) (0.240) (0.260) (0.318) (0.331) (0.0958)
Total emigration ratet￿5 0.819*** 0.848*** 0.518** 0.589** 1.127*** 1.203*** 0.0616
(0.317) (0.329) (0.260) (0.274) (0.379) (0.399) (0.116)
Log populationt￿5 0.0456* 0.0452* 0.00971 0.0129 0.0644** 0.0673** -0.00437
(0.0246) (0.0257) (0.0153) (0.0171) (0.0281) (0.0306) (0.00657)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
AR(2) test 0.551 0.562 0.579 0.621 0.856 0.852 0.210
Hansen J test 0.414 0.429 0.252 0.113 0.391 0.181 0.997
Observations 456 456 456 456 432 432 216
N. countries 76 76 76 76 72 72 36
N. instr. 74 62 74 62 74 62 62
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. One step system GMM
estimator. The sample is a balanced sample comprising data at ￿ve year interval between 1980 and 2005. AR(1) and
AR(2) are the p-values of Arellano-Bond test for serial correlations. The values reported for the Hansen J test are
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. All the variables are treated as pre-determined. They are
instrumented for using their own ￿rst to third lags in columns 1, 3 , 5. They are instrumented for using their own
￿rst to second lags in columns 2, 4, 6, 7. In addition to these instruments, the system GMM also uses as instruments


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































223 Country speci￿c results for skilled emigration
The estimation results above suggest that both openness to migration (as measured
by the total emigration rate) and human capital (as measured by the share of tertiary
educated in the resident labor force) have a positive impact on domestic institutional
quality. What happens, then, when an educated invidual emigrates? As we have
seen, the share of skilled among emigrants is never signi￿cant in our regressions.
Furthermore, interacting this variable with either human capital or emigration creates
multicollinearity problems that further prevent us from testing empirically whether
the institutional gain from migration is higher or lower when the composition of
emigration becomes more high-skill. In addition, independently of the average e⁄ect
we would also like to know which countries would gain or lose from having more skilled
migration. For these reasons, in what follows we will rely on numerical simulations
to address the following questions:
i) Which countries would lose/gain from a marginal increase in high-skilled emi-
gration?
ii) And which countries would lose/gain from having a non-selective emigration,
that is, from having their high-skilled emigration rates counterfactually reduced so
as to equal their low-skilled emigration rate?
To answer these questions we start from the empirical model (1) and then proceed
with numerical experiments. To do so, we need to use additional notations and
supplement equation (1) with some identities. Let us drop country and time indexes
to simplify the notations. Each country at each period is characterized by Nk natives
of skill k (with k = s for the highly skilled and k = u for the low skilled) and Mk
emigrants. The skill-speci￿c emigration rates are de￿ned as mk = Mk=Nk. Ex-ante
(or before-migration) human capital is measured by the proportion of highly skilled
among natives, i.e. H ￿ Ns
Ns+Nu. With these notations, it is clear we can write the




= msH + mu(1 ￿ H);
and the ex-post (or after-migration) proportion of highly skilled in (1) is given by:
h ￿
H(1 ￿ ms)
H(1 ￿ ms) + (1 ￿ H)(1 ￿ mu)
23If we assume that human capital is independent of migration (i.e., we neglect any
incentives to acquire additional human capital in a context of migration or, in other
words, we take H as given), then we can write the partial derivatives of m and h with
respect to ms and mu as:
@m
@ms
= H > 0;
@m
@mu




￿H(1 ￿ H)(1 ￿ mu)







H(1 ￿ H)(1 ￿ ms)




Recalling the empirical model and the estimated equation (1), we may consider
that democracy, or more generally let￿ s denote it institutional quality I, depends on
the total emigration rate, m, and on the share of highly skilled human capital in the
resident labor force, h.24 We write:
I = ￿1h + ￿2m + ￿3X (2)
￿1;￿2 > 0
The e⁄ect of emigration rates on institutions is then given by:
dI
dms










This shows that the e⁄ect of low skilled emigration is always positive while the
e⁄ect of high-skilled emigration is ambiguous. Focusing on skilled emigration, we can







24Comparing (1) and (2), we have Ii;t = Democracyi;t+5 ￿ ￿0:Democracyi;t. In the long-run
(indexed by ss), we have Ii;ss = (1￿￿0):Democracyi;ss.Our variable I proxies long-run institutional
quality or transitional institutional improvement.
24(ii) the condition for a positive optimal brain drain ( dI





1 ￿ mu(1 ￿ H)
￿ z0;
(iii) and the condition for an interior optimal brain drain ( dI





(1 ￿ mu)(1 ￿ H)
￿ z1:
In these conditions, variables zs, z0 and z1 are country-speci￿c and their distri-
bution can be computed using the Gaussian kernel density estimator. The ratio
￿2
￿1
results from our estimation. Using the point estimates from our baseline regressions
both in an unbalanced and balanced sample (column (3) of tables 1, 2, 3, 4 for the
unbalanced sample, and columns (1), (3), (5) of table 5 for the balanced sample),
we can simulate these three conditions.25 To save place and given that we are mostly
interested in the ￿rst of these conditions, we do not present simulation results for the
last two.26
Figures 2a to 2d show the kernel distribution of 1￿h
1￿m ￿ zs and vertical lines at
values of
￿2
￿1 for the 4 indicators (thick lines for the unbalanced sample; thin lines
for the balanced sample). As can be seen from the ￿gures, the marginal e⁄ect of the
skilled emigration rate is positive for almost all of the countries (the kernel distribution
is completely to the left of the thresholds, except for CL in a balanced sample).27
However, when we calculate 90 percent con￿dence intervals (dashed lines) for the
vertical lines at values of
￿2
￿1 for each of the 4 indicators (both in the balanced and
unbalanced samples28),29 this result turns out to be not signi￿cant since the bulk of
the kernel distribution lies between the upper and lower bounds of the con￿dence
interval.
25For the simulations, we consider the unbalanced sample of 91 countries as in column (3) of
tables 1 and 2. Data considered refer to year 2000 from Barro and Lee (2001) and Defoort (2008).
When Barro and Lee (2001) data on human capital are missing for year 2000, the human capital
data from Defoort (2008) are considered (this happens for 11 countries).
26They are available from the authors upon request.
27The few "losers" (negative marginal e⁄ect) are all with extremely high brain drain rates.
28For EFW indicator, we consider only the unbalanced sample as in the balanced sample both
￿1;￿2 are not signi￿cant and there are too few observations.
29Con￿dence intervals of
￿2
￿1 are computed using the Stata command nlcom. Calculations follows
the delta method, a method based on Taylor series expansions used for deriving variance approxi-
mations and con￿dence intervals for transformed variables.
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Legend: Kernel density of zs. Vertical continuous lines = mean value of
￿2
￿1
. Vertical dashed lines
= con￿dence interval at 90 percent (thick lines for unbalanced panel, thin lines for balanced panel)
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= con￿dence interval at 90 percent (thick lines for unbalanced panel, thin lines for balanced panel)
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Legend: Kernel density of zs. Vertical continuous lines = mean value of
￿2
￿1
. Vertical dashed lines
= con￿dence interval at 90 percent (thick lines for unbalanced panel, thin lines for balanced panel)
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Legend: Kernel density of zs. Vertical continuous lines = mean value of
￿2
￿1
. Vertical dashed lines
= con￿dence interval at 90 percent obtained with the unbalanced panel.
27Turning to the second of our questions (i.e., which countries would lose/gain from
having a non-selective emigration), we simulate the counterfactual quality of insti-
tutions obtained when the skilled emigration rate is set to be equal to the unskilled
emigration rate. This assumption implies a decrease in the skilled emigration rate.
Noting that:
I = ￿1h + ￿2m + ￿3X
and assuming ms = mu = e m, we have:
e I = ￿1e h + ￿2e m + ￿3X
where and e h is the resulting share of skilled in the resident labor force.
The change in institutional quality is given by:
￿I ￿ e I ￿ I = ￿1(e h ￿ h) + ￿2(mu ￿ m)
It is straightforward to see that ￿I < 0 if:





(e h ￿ h)
(m ￿ mu)
￿ zI
Figures 3a to 3d show the kernel distribution of zI and vertical lines at values
of
￿2
￿1 for the 4 indicators (CL, PR, Polity2 and EFW) in the unbalanced (thick
lines) and balanced (thin lines) samples. The results from this second simulation
are similar to those of the ￿rst exercise. The fact that the kernel distribution is
almost completely to the left of the thresholds suggests an institutional gain for
nearly all the countries in our sample from having positively selected migrants (i.e.,
the counterfactual simulation from equating migration propensities across education
groups yields an institutional loss), however this e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant
as the distribution lies between the upper and the lower bounds of the con￿dence
intervals.
28Figure 3.a. Counterfactual simulation of the e⁄ect of skilled emigration on
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Legend: Kernel density of zI. Vertical continuous lines = mean value of
￿2
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= con￿dence interval at 90 percent (thick lines for unbalanced panel, thin lines for balanced panel)
Figure 3.b. Counterfactual simulation of the e⁄ect of skilled emigration on
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Legend: Kernel density of zI. Vertical continuous lines = mean value of
￿2
￿1
. Vertical dashed lines
= con￿dence interval at 90 percent (thick lines for unbalanced panel, thin lines for balanced panel)
29Figure 3.c. Counterfactual simulation of the e⁄ect of skilled emigration on
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Legend: Kernel density of zI. Vertical continuous lines = mean value of
￿2
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. Vertical dashed lines
= con￿dence interval at 90 percent (thick lines for unbalanced panel, thin lines for balanced panel)
Figure 3.d. Counterfactual simulation of the e⁄ect of skilled emigration on
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Legend: Kernel density of zI. Vertical continuous lines = mean value of
￿2
￿1
. Vertical dashed lines
= con￿dence interval at 90 percent obtained with the unbalanced panel.
30In both simulations exercises, however, we have neglected any possible incentive
(or "brain gain") e⁄ects of migration on human capital formation. Following an im-
portant theoretical literature, such incentive e⁄ects have been identi￿ed in a series
of recent micro (e.g., Gibson and McKenzie, 2011) and macro (Beine et al., 2008,
2010) empirical papers.30 The last question we want to ask, therefore, is the follow-
ing: which countries would lose/gain from a marginal increase in skilled emigration if
incentive e⁄ects were accounted for? If we assume there are additional incentives to
invest in human capital when there is a positive di⁄erential emigration probabilities
for highly educated (which is an empirical regularity), then we should write:
H = H(ms ￿ mu);
with H
0 = dH
dms > 0 and dH
dms:ms￿mu
H = ￿















￿1H0(1 ￿ ms)(1 ￿ mu)
(1 ￿ m)2
After some manipulations, it is easy to see that the marginal impact of skilled
emigration on institutional quality will be positive (i.e., dI





(1 ￿ m)(1 + ￿)
￿
￿(1 ￿ ms)(1 ￿ mu)
(1 + ￿)(ms ￿ mu)(1 ￿ m)2 ￿ zh
To be able to simulate the marginal impact of an increase in skilled migration in
a context of endogenous human capital, we need to give a value to ￿, the e⁄ect of
emigration on human capital formation. We will use several values for ￿, in particular
￿ = 0:05 (closer to the point estimate in Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2010):
￿ = 0:054)31 , ￿ = 0:01, ￿ = 0:10 (which correspond to the values of the lower
and upper bounds of the 90 percent con￿dence interval of the estimated point), and
￿ = 0:23 which corresponds to the long-run elasticity of human capital formation to
high-skill migration prospects.32
30See Docquier and Rapoport (2009) for a survey of this recent brain drain literature.
31Note that since this value is for the short-run elasticity of human capital formation to the
di⁄erential emigration probability, it can be seen as a conservative estimate.
32In unreported simulations, we also use the lower and upper bound of the 90 percent con￿dence
31As can be seen from Figures 4a to 4d, which simulate this condition for our
four indicators, the kernel distribution shifts downward and to the left for higher
values of ￿: We also include a 90 percent con￿dence interval for the threshold
￿2
￿1
as we did in the previous simulations (dashed and thick lines for the unbalanced
sample, dashed and thin lines for the balanced one). In the presence of incentive
e⁄ects on human capital, in the short-run the marginal e⁄ect of skilled emigration on
institutional quality now appears positive and signi￿cant for a limited set of countries.
For example, if we consider the Polity2 indicator (which has the lowest lower bound
of con￿dence intervals among all the 4 indicators) in the unbalanced sample and the
kernel distribution with ￿ = 0:05, the countries with a marginal positive e⁄ect will
be: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Namibia, Russia, Swaziland, Thailand,
Turkey, Venezuela. If we consider the PR indicator instead we will have in addition to
the previous ones: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Burma, Chile, China, Costa Rica,
Egypt, India, Lesotho, Lybia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Syria. On the contrary, if we
believe in major human capital enhancement e⁄ects in the long-run, and we consider
the kernel distribution with ￿ = 0:23, the marginal e⁄ect of skilled emigration on
institutional quality becomes positive for many countries.33
4 Conclusion
Emigration a⁄ects institutions in developing countries in many ways. By providing
people with exit options and a safety-net through remittance income, emigration
can lower incentives to voice internally and, eventually, delay democratic reform and
political change; on the other hand, emigrants can voice from abroad and support
diverse political groups and views at home; they can also contribute to the di⁄usion of
democratic values and norms, be it directly, through return migration and contacts
with relatives, or indirectly, through their belonging to social networks connecting
diasporas and home-country populations. Finally, since migration is a non-random
interval of the long-run estimated elasticity, i.e. ￿ = 0:06, and ￿ = 0:4. See Table 13 of the Appendix
for the list of countries in our sample and the simulation results country by country.
33Human capital incentive long-run e⁄ects take about 50 years to operate (convergence = 20%
per decade). We have to observe that the long-run elasticity is calculated considering estimations in
Beine et al. (2010), where a beta-convergence model is estimated using OLS. We know that in this
case the estimated beta convergence coe¢ cient may be biased. This may cause a larger magnitude of
our long-run elasticity. At the same time, we have also to note that larger long-run elasticities were
obtained for poor countries in Beine, Docquier and Oden-Defoort (2011), who use panel regressions.
32process, emigration alters the composition of the home-country population on several
dimensions (notably education and ethnicity) that can in turn a⁄ect democracy at
home.
In this paper we ￿rst document these channels and then consider dynamic-panel
regressions to investigate the overall impact of emigration on institutions in a large
sample of developing countries. We ￿nd that openness to migration (measured by
the total emigration rate) contributes to improve institutional quality (as measured
by standard indicators of democracy and economic freedom) in the migrants￿origin
countries. This result is robust to the use of balanced/unbalanced panels, to the ex-
clusion of certain groups of countries (e.g., former socialist countries) or to accounting
for the low-coverage of certain countries in our migration data. We also ￿nd that hu-
man capital (measured by the share of tertiary educated in the resident labor force)
has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on institutional quality. Since skilled emigration
both increases total emigration and reduces average human capital, this raises the
question of whether some countries can achieve an institutional gain through a brain
drain. To answer this question we rely on numerical simulations which show a posi-
tive but generally statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ect of skilled emigration. However, once
we account for the fact that emigration prospects provide additional incentives to
invest in human capital, then the e⁄ect of skilled emigration on institutional quality
becomes positive for a limited set of countries in the short run and for many countries
in the longer run.
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396 Appendix: robustness analysis (not for publica-
tion)
Table 7: Dep. Var. - Political Rights Index - PR(no socialist countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PRt￿5 0.606*** 0.585*** 0.561*** 0.619***
(0.0667) (0.0684) (0.0620) (0.0678) )
Human capitalt￿5 0.657** 0.805** 0.231 0.717**
(0.318) (0.342) (0.389) (0.337)
Total emigration ratet￿5 0.840*** 0.851*** 0.596* 0.973***
(0.289) (0.282) (0.332) (0.314)
Log populationt￿5 0.0280 0.0277 0.00832 0.0417*
(0.0194) (0.0185) (0.0175) (0.0238)
Log GDP per capitat￿5 0.0568**
(0.0287)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test 0.687 0.697 0.543 0.704
Hansen J test 0.330 0.449 0.468 0.526
Observations 425 425 386 414
N. countries 79 79 74 69
N. instr. 74 62 76 62
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. One step system
GMM estimator. Unbalanced and balanced sample include data at ￿ve year interval between 1980 and 2005. AR(1)
and AR(2) are the p-values of Arellano-Bond test for serial correlations. The values reported for the Hansen J test
are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. All the variables are treated as pre-determined. They
are instrumented for using their own ￿rst to further lags, according to the speci￿cation. In particular, column (1)
and (2) show the results for our baseline speci￿cation when control variables of interest are instrumented for using
their own to their third and second lags respectively. Column (3) introduces gdp per capita (in logs) as a control
variable, while column (4) considers a balanced sample. In column (3) and (4) control variables are instrumented for
using their own to their second lags. In addition to these instruments, the system GMM also uses as instruments for
the level equations the explanatory variables in the ￿rst di⁄erences lagged one period.
40Table 8: Dep. Var. - Civil Liberties Index - CL(no socialist countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLt￿5 0.603*** 0.585*** 0.535*** 0.606***
(0.0657) (0.0709) (0.0577) (0.0650)
Human capitalt￿5 0.579** 0.618** 0.193 0.572**
(0.236) (0.242) (0.258) (0.231)
Total emigration ratet￿5 0.655*** 0.712*** 0.568** 0.627**
(0.240) (0.252) (0.252) (0.262)
Log populationt￿5 0.0134 0.0142 0.000336 0.00692
(0.0143) (0.0150) (0.0145) (0.0163)
Log GDP per capitat￿5 0.0433**
(0.0206)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test 0.300 0.314 0.593 0.306
Hansen J test 0.239 0.108 0.326 0.188
Observations 425 425 386 414
N. countries 79 79 74 69
N. instr. 74 62 76 62
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. One step system
GMM estimator. Unbalanced and balanced sample include data at ￿ve year interval between 1980 and 2005. AR(1)
and AR(2) are the p-values of Arellano-Bond test for serial correlations. The values reported for the Hansen J test
are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. All the variables are treated as pre-determined. They
are instrumented for their own ￿rst to further lags, according to the speci￿cation. In particular, column (1) and (2)
show the results for our baseline speci￿cation when control variables of interest are instrumented using for their own
to their third and second lags respectively. Column (3) introduces gdp per capita (in logs) as a control variable,
while column (4) considers a balanced sample. In column (3) and (4) control variables are instrumented using for
their own to their second lags. In addition to these instruments, the system GMM also uses as instruments for the
level equations the explanatory variables in the ￿rst di⁄erences lagged one period.
41Table 9: Dep. Var. - Polity2 Index (no socialist countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Polity2t￿5 0.608*** 0.596*** 0.568*** 0.592***
(0.0700) (0.0724) (0.0673) (0.0708)
Human capitalt￿5 0.381 0.391 0.0384 0.373
(0.289) (0.306) (0.354) (0.307)
Total emigration ratet￿5 1.232*** 1.372*** 0.911** 1.307***
(0.345) (0.382) (0.367) (0.378)
Log populationt￿5 0.0642*** 0.0758*** 0.0329 0.0737***
(0.0233) (0.0247) (0.0238) (0.0268)
Log GDP per capitat￿5 0.0580**
(0.0293)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test 0.495 0.492 0.527 0.648
Hansen J test 0.497 0.307 0.533 0.407
Observations 408 408 375 390
N. countries 73 73 68 65
N. instr. 74 62 76 62
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. One step system
GMM estimator. Unbalanced and balanced sample include data at ￿ve year interval between 1980 and 2005. AR(1)
and AR(2) are the p-values of Arellano-Bond test for serial correlations. The values reported for the Hansen J test
are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. All the variables are treated as pre-determined. They
are instrumented for their own ￿rst to further lags, according to the speci￿cation. In particular, column (1) and (2)
show the results for our baseline speci￿cation when control variables of interest are instrumented using for their own
to their third and second lags respectively. Column (3) introduces gdp per capita (in logs) as a control variable,
while column (4) considers a balanced sample. In column (3) and (4) control variables are instrumented using for
their own to their second lags.In addition to these instruments, the system GMM also uses as instruments for the
level equations the explanatory variables in the ￿rst di⁄erences lagged one period.




Human capitalt￿5 0.155* 0.0472
(0.0887) (0.120)
Total emigration ratet￿5 0.172** 0.158*
(0.0752) (0.0850)
Log populationt￿5 0.00160 -0.00115
(0.00538) (0.00474)
Log GDP per capitat￿5 0.00520
(0.0107)
Time dummies yes yes
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test 0.0537 0.0508
Hansen J test 0.515 0.860
Observations 337 329
N. countries 64 64
N. instr. 62 76
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. One step system
GMM estimator. Unbalanced and balanced sample include data at ￿ve year interval between 1980 and 2005. AR(1)
and AR(2) are the p-values of Arellano-Bond test for serial correlations. The values reported for the Hansen J test
are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. All the variables are treated as pre-determined.
Column (1) shows the results for our baseline speci￿cation when control variables of interest are instrumented for
using their own to their second lags. Column (2) introduces gdp per capita (in logs) as a control variable. In column
(2) control variables are also instrumented for using their own to their second lags. In addition to these instruments,
the system GMM also uses as instruments for the level equations the explanatory variables in the ￿rst di⁄erences






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45Table 13: Country speci￿c impact of skilled migration on institutional quality
Countries zs zI zh (￿ = 0:05) zh (￿ = 0:10) zh(￿ = 0:01) zh(￿ = 0:23)
Afghanistan 0.990 0.984 0.754 0.540 0.941 0.064
Algeria 0.976 0.973 -0.013 -0.912 0.771 -2.908
Argentina 0.809 0.806 -2.122 -4.787 0.199 -10.701
Bangladesh 0.971 0.969 -0.304 -1.463 0.705 -4.036
Barbados 1.300 1.150 1.165 1.043 1.272 0.771
Belize 1.267 1.133 1.151 1.045 1.243 0.810
Benin 0.986 0.984 0.540 0.135 0.893 -0.765
Bolivia 0.867 0.861 -0.233 -1.232 0.638 -3.451
Botswana 0.964 0.963 -0.591 -2.005 0.641 -5.143
Brazil 0.918 0.917 -2.535 -5.674 0.200 -12.640
Bulgaria 0.819 0.815 -1.039 -2.728 0.433 -6.476
Burma (Myanmar) 0.969 0.968 -0.313 -1.478 0.703 -4.065
Burundi 0.983 0.981 0.278 -0.362 0.836 -1.783
Cameroon 0.987 0.984 0.677 0.396 0.923 -0.229
Central African Republic 0.985 0.984 0.262 -0.396 0.835 -1.855
Chile 0.854 0.848 -0.273 -1.297 0.620 -3.571
China 0.976 0.975 -0.454 -1.753 0.678 -4.636
Colombia 0.920 0.912 0.324 -0.219 0.796 -1.423
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 0.989 0.988 0.347 -0.238 0.856 -1.534
Congo, Rep. of the 0.982 0.972 0.726 0.494 0.929 -0.022
Costa Rica 0.838 0.830 -0.166 -1.078 0.629 -3.103
Croatia 1.013 0.998 0.601 0.226 0.927 -0.606
Cuba 0.986 0.956 0.745 0.526 0.936 0.041
Czech Republic 0.907 0.900 0.144 -0.549 0.748 -2.087
Dominica 1.429 1.269 1.258 1.103 1.393 0.759
Dominican Republic 0.973 0.954 0.514 0.097 0.878 -0.828
Ecuador 0.849 0.841 -0.137 -1.033 0.644 -3.022
Egypt 0.900 0.896 -0.324 -1.436 0.646 -3.906
El Salvador 1.111 1.091 0.715 0.355 1.029 -0.444
Ethiopia 0.983 0.981 0.454 -0.027 0.873 -1.096
Fiji 1.123 1.043 1.012 0.912 1.100 0.689
Gambia, The 1.011 1.005 0.929 0.854 0.994 0.687
Ghana 1.006 0.997 0.898 0.799 0.984 0.581
Guatemala 1.024 1.011 0.740 0.481 0.965 -0.092
Guyana 1.652 1.361 1.555 1.467 1.632 1.271
Haiti 1.118 1.069 1.052 0.992 1.104 0.859
Honduras 1.014 1.000 0.737 0.485 0.957 -0.074
Hungary 0.908 0.897 0.384 -0.092 0.799 -1.150
India 0.956 0.954 -0.205 -1.259 0.715 -3.600
Indonesia 0.951 0.950 -2.682 -5.985 0.195 -13.315
Iran 0.947 0.938 0.559 0.206 0.867 -0.577
Iraq 0.931 0.925 0.288 -0.297 0.797 -1.595
Jamaica 1.481 1.270 1.389 1.306 1.462 1.121
Jordan 0.811 0.801 -0.081 -0.891 0.626 -2.691
Kenya 1.004 0.996 0.871 0.750 0.976 0.483
Lesotho 0.990 0.990 -0.392 -1.648 0.703 -4.437
Liberia 1.007 0.987 0.896 0.795 0.984 0.570
Libya 0.899 0.895 -0.359 -1.503 0.637 -4.041
46Countries zs zI zh (￿ = 0:05) zh (￿ = 0:10) zh(￿ = 0:01) zh(￿ = 0:23)
Malawi 0.998 0.996 0.758 0.540 0.948 0.056
Malaysia 0.938 0.930 0.442 -0.008 0.835 -1.007
Mali 1.003 1.002 0.638 0.306 0.927 -0.430
Mauritania 0.988 0.986 0.497 0.051 0.886 -0.939
Mauritius 1.076 1.046 0.973 0.880 1.055 0.672
Mexico 1.014 1.009 -0.470 -1.819 0.705 -4.812
Mozambique 0.999 0.999 0.751 0.526 0.948 0.026
Namibia 0.962 0.936 -0.887 -2.567 0.577 -6.296
Nepal 0.978 0.977 -0.057 -0.998 0.763 -3.086
Nicaragua 0.997 0.969 0.781 0.585 0.952 0.150
Niger 0.996 0.995 0.150 -0.619 0.820 -2.326
Pakistan 0.982 0.978 0.571 0.198 0.896 -0.631
Panama 0.852 0.829 0.453 0.089 0.769 -0.717
Papua New Guinea 0.995 0.990 0.813 0.647 0.957 0.279
Paraguay 0.923 0.920 -0.586 -1.958 0.609 -5.003
Peru 0.793 0.786 -0.521 -1.715 0.519 -4.366
Philippines 0.814 0.791 0.388 0.001 0.725 -0.859
Poland 0.922 0.911 0.456 0.031 0.825 -0.910
Romania 0.927 0.920 0.345 -0.184 0.806 -1.359
Russia 0.802 0.791 -3.881 -8.139 -0.171 -17.589
Rwanda 0.998 0.996 0.783 0.587 0.953 0.154
S. Lucia 1.239 1.142 1.144 1.058 1.219 0.867
S. Vincent and the Gren. 1.502 1.283 1.407 1.321 1.482 1.130
Senegal 0.995 0.991 0.676 0.386 0.929 -0.257
Seychelles 1.193 1.112 1.113 1.040 1.176 0.878
Sierra Leone 1.010 1.000 0.917 0.832 0.991 0.643
Slovakia 0.903 0.896 0.145 -0.544 0.745 -2.073
South Africa 0.907 0.901 0.154 -0.531 0.751 -2.050
Sri Lanka 0.994 0.984 0.811 0.645 0.956 0.276
Sudan 0.983 0.982 0.248 -0.420 0.830 -1.903
Swaziland 0.958 0.958 -9.952 -19.870 -1.310 -41.884
Syria 0.882 0.877 -0.180 -1.146 0.661 -3.289
Thailand 0.892 0.890 -1.683 -4.024 0.357 -9.219
Togo 0.991 0.986 0.723 0.479 0.935 -0.061
Trinidad and Tobago 1.275 1.118 1.191 1.114 1.257 0.944
Tunisia 0.983 0.978 0.322 -0.280 0.846 -1.614
Turkey 0.958 0.958 -5.140 -10.685 -0.310 -22.990
Uganda 1.001 0.997 0.862 0.736 0.972 0.455
Uruguay 0.892 0.885 0.023 -0.767 0.711 -2.520
Venezuela 0.826 0.822 -0.986 -2.633 0.450 -6.289
Vietnam 0.994 0.982 0.796 0.616 0.953 0.216
Zambia 0.987 0.984 0.673 0.387 0.922 -0.248
Zimbabwe 0.960 0.953 0.532 0.144 0.871 -0.718








PR 1.378 -0.14563 2.90214 1.155 0.055266 2.255557
CL 1.146 0.099587 2.192358 0.821 0.057627 1.583564
Polity2 2.670051 -0.61846 5.958563 2.079336 -0.22539 4.386075





















































































































































































































































































































































































2009‐26  Remittances  and  the  Brain  Drain  Revisited:  The  Microdata  Show 
That More Educated Migrants Remit More 
Albert Bollard, David McKenzie, Melanie Morten and Hillel Rapoport, October 
2009. 
2009‐27  Implementability of Correlated and Communication Equilibrium 
Outcomes in Incomplete Information Games 
Igal Milchtaich, November 2009. 
2010‐01  The Ultimatum Game and Expected Utility Maximization – In View of 
Attachment Theory 
Shaul Almakias and Avi Weiss, January 2010. 
2010‐02  A Model of Fault Allocation in Contract Law – Moving From Dividing 
Liability to Dividing Costs 
Osnat Jacobi and Avi Weiss, January 2010. 2010‐03  Coordination and Critical Mass in a Network Market: An 
Experimental Investigation 
Bradley J. Ruffle, Avi Weiss and Amir Etziony, February 2010. 
2010‐04  Immigration, fertility and human capital: A model of economic 
decline of the West 
Leonid V. Azarnert, April 2010. 
2010‐05  Is Skilled Immigration Always Good for Growth in the Receiving 
Economy? 
Leonid V. Azarnert, April 2010. 
2010‐06  The Effect of Limited Search Ability on the Quality of Competitive 
Rent‐Seeking Clubs 
Shmuel Nitzan and Kobi Kriesler, April 2010. 
2010‐07  Condorcet vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach 
Eyal Baharad and Shmuel Nitzan, April 2010. 
2010‐08  Prize Sharing in Collective Contests 
Shmuel Nitzan  and Kaoru Ueda, April 2010. 
2010‐09  Network Topology and Equilibrium Existence in Weighted Network 
Congestion Games 
Igal Milchtaich, May 2010. 
2010‐10  The Evolution of Secularization: Cultural Transmission, Religion and 
Fertility Theory, Simulations and Evidence 
Ronen Bar‐El, Teresa García‐Muñoz, Shoshana Neuman and Yossef Tobol, 
June 2010. 
2010‐11  The Economics of Collective Brands 
Arthur Fishman, Israel Finkelstein, Avi Simhon and Nira Yacouel, July 2010. 
2010‐12  Interactions Between Local and Migrant Workers at the Workplace 
Gil S. Epstein and Yosef Mealem, August 2010. 
2010‐13  A Political Economy of the Immigrant Assimilation: Internal 
Dynamics 
Gil S. Epstein and Ira N. Gang, August 2010. 
2010‐14  Attitudes to Risk and Roulette 
Adi Schnytzer and Sara Westreich, August 2010. 2010‐15  Life Satisfaction and Income Inequality 
Paolo Verme, August 2010. 
2010‐16  The Poverty Reduction Capacity of Private and Public Transfers in 
Transition 
Paolo Verme, August 2010. 
2010‐17  Migration and Culture 
Gil S. Epstein and Ira N. Gang, August 2010. 
2010‐18  Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests 
Gil S. Epstein, Yosef Mealem and Shmuel Nitzan, October 2010. 
2010‐19  Governing Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation 
Gil S. Epstein and Yosef Mealem, November 2010. 
2010‐20  Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records 
Eyal Baharad, Jacob Goldberger, Moshe Koppel and Shmuel Nitzan, 
December 2010. 
2010‐21  Price Points and Price Rigidity 
Daniel Levy, Dongwon Lee, Haipeng (Allan) Chen, Robert J. Kauffman and 
Mark Bergen, December 2010. 
2010‐22  Price Setting and Price Adjustment in Some European Union 
Countries: Introduction to the Special Issue 
Daniel Levy and Frank Smets, December 2010. 
2011‐01  Business as Usual: A Consumer Search Theory of Sticky Prices and 
Asymmetric Price Adjustment 
Luís Cabral and Arthur Fishman, January 2011. 
2011‐02  Emigration and democracy 
Frédéric Docquier, Elisabetta Lodigiani, Hillel Rapoport and Maurice Schiff, 
January 2011. 
 